Can a homeowners association prevent a member from using a private subdivision road to access property located outside the subdivision? And what happens when a community association waits too long to challenge an easement that has been recorded for decades? In Carnegie Woods Property Owners Association v Czajka, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, November 17, 2025 (Docket No. 371756), the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed those questions in a dispute involving road access, prescriptive easement claims, alleged overburdening of an easement, and slander of title. The decision provides important guidance for Michigan community associations on how courts interpret governing documents, enforce easement language, and apply statutes of limitation. For HOA boards, the case is a reminder that governing documents are contracts that will be enforced as written. It also underscores that enforcement authority, while broad, is limited and must be exercised within the confines of recorded documents and Michigan law.
Factual Background of the HOA’s Enforcement of the Easement
In Carnegie Woods Property Owners Association v Czajka, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, November 17, 2025 (Docket No. 371756), Carnegie Woods Property Owners Association was confronted with a homeowner who purchased an undeveloped lot within the subdivision (Lot 1) and an adjoining outside lot (Lot 0), and sought to utilize a Subdivision easement. Brad Czajka purchased Lot 0, a portion of a property located outside the Subdivision, in 1995, from Harlan and Claudia Maurer. The Maurers retained a greater piece of property. The sale agreement additionally created a driveway easement across the Maurers’ property and Mr. Czajka’s Lot 0, which stated as follows: “The purpose of the easement was to connect the Maurers’ property to Carnegie Trail and Czajka to land and roadways west of the Maurers’ property, giving both properties access to ‘public roadways.’” Carnegie Trail, referenced above, was a road within the subdivision to which each member of the homeowners association had an easement. Specifically, a Proprietor’s Certificate stated that Carnegie Trail is private and for the use of the Lot owners of Carnegie Woods Subdivision only.
In 1998, Mr. Czajka purchased Lot 1, located next to Lot 0. At this time, both Lots 0 and 1 lacked any structures and were used primarily to access woods and the beachfront. Having spent most of the next 20-plus years only rarely visiting the properties, on January 17, 2020, Mr. Czajka obtained a building permit from the township to build a pole barn on Lot 0. Thereafter, Mr. Czajka removed public access to Lot 0, began removing trees on Lot 1, and repaired and graded the sand driveway on Lot 1 to handle the weight of commercial trucks driving to Lot 0. Mr. Czajka additionally intended to allow the commercial trucks to use Carnegie Trail to access Lots 1 and 0.
On October 3, 2022, the homeowners association gave written notice to Mr. Czajka that Carnegie Trail could not be used for transporting fill, construction material, concrete trucks, or other delivery trucks, could not be used by contractors servicing land outside of the Subdivision, transporting pre-assembled buildings of any kind, or to provide individual access to land outside of the Subdivision. Mr. Czajka failed to respond to the homeowners association but did cease development of the two lots. Around this time, the HOA conducted a title search of the two lots and discovered the Easement agreement between Mr. Czajka and the Maurers, which granted the Maurers access to Carnegie Trail.
The homeowners association filed a lawsuit against Mr. Czajka with the following counts: (1) declaratory relief from the court stating that Carnegie Trail is a private road for the exclusive use of the property owners in the subdivision; (2) injunctive relief preventing Mr. Czajka from using Carnegie Trail to access Lot 0, and prohibiting him from allowing non-association members to use Carnegie Trail on their own, or his behalf and declaring the Maurer Easement to be invalid, as well as a permanent injunction prohibiting the use of Carnegie Trail for anyone other than lot owners and members of the Association; (3) trespass against Mr. Czajka for creating a driveway on Lot 1 into Lot 0 and allowing ingress and egress across Carnegie Trail to access Lot 0 directly, and granting the easement to Maurer; and (4) slander of title for granting an easement on Carnegie Trail to non-Association members.
Mr. Czajka filed a counter-complaint asking the Court to declare that he had a “prescriptive easement to use Carnegie Trail to access Lot 0, and that the HOA only had nonexclusive rights to Carnegie Trail and could not bar Czajka from using it to access Lot 0. Mr. Czajka additionally sought monetary damages for alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
The trial court ultimately entered an order stating the following:
- The HOA’s slander of title claim was barred by the statute of limitations;
- Czajka did not acquire a prescriptive easement to use Carnegie Trail to directly access Lot 0;
- The homeowners association did not breach a fiduciary duty;
- Czajka’s use of Carnegie Trail was not trespass because he used it consistently with the dedication found in the Proprietor’s Certificate.
- Czajka was permitted to use Carnegie Trail to access Lot 1, and once on Lot 1, to access Lot 0;
- Czajka could not grant third parties the right to use Carnegie Trail. However, as a member of the HOA based upon his ownership of Lot 1, he could allow invitees, including friends, family, and commercial service providers, to use Carnegie Trail;
- Czajka could not use Carnegie Trail for a commercial purpose; and
- A permanent injunction would be issued prohibiting all parties from accessing Lot 0 directly from Carnegie Trail.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the above decision.
The Owner Failed to Establish a Prescriptive Easement
Mr. Czajka sought a prescriptive easement allowing him to use Carnegie Trail to directly access Lot 0. Prescriptive easements are similar to adverse possession property claims in that they are created by open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use for a period of fifteen years. Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc v Prose, 242 Mich App 676, 679; 619 NW2d 725 (2000) and MCL 600.5801(4).
The Court found that Mr. Czajka could not satisfy the “continuous use” factor. Mr. Czajka did not visit the properties regularly, particularly during a period when he had relocated to Utah. Mr. Czajka additionally testified that when visiting the properties, he usually parked his car on Lot 1 and then accessed Lot 0 from there. The Court of Appeals stated, “the record reflects infrequent use of Carnegie Trail to directly access Lot 0.” Mr. Czajka could not show that he used Carnegie Trail to directly access Lot 0 for the requisite 15 years necessary to establish a prescriptive easement.
The Scope of the Road Easement
The homeowners association argued that the Proprietor’s Certificate allowed Mr. Czajka to use Carnegie Trail only to access Lot 1, which is located within the subdivision. According to the HOA, the easement did not permit him to use the road to reach Lot 0 because that parcel lies outside the subdivision. The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed. Relying on Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co v MacDonald, 193 Mich App 571; 485 NW2d 129 (1992), the Court applied the plain language of the Proprietor’s Certificate, which states: “Carnegie Trail is private and for the use of the lot owners of Carnegie Woods Subdivision only.” The Court concluded that the easement grants subdivision lot owners exclusive use of the road, but it does not restrict how they may use it. Because Mr. Czajka owned Lot 1 within the subdivision, he was among the lot owners entitled to use Carnegie Trail.
The homeowners association additionally argued that Mr. Czajka’s use would overly burden Carnegie Trail. A “dominant estate may not make improvements to the servient estate if such improvements are unnecessary for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably burden the servient tenement.” Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 701; 664 NW2d 749 (2003). The Association argued that the use of commercial trucks would cause damage and wear and tear on Carnegie Trail exceeding what is necessary for simple access. The homeowners association failed to present any evidence to support its argument and had admitted that it did not object to Mr. Czajka using the easement solely to access Lot 1. The admission and lack of substantive evidence demonstrating an unreasonable burden to the Carnegie Trail easement caused the Court of Appeals to dismiss the count.
The HOA Owner’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Failed
Mr. Czajka claimed the lawsuit was retaliatory and a breach of its fiduciary duty. “[A] fiduciary relationship arises from the reposing of faith, confidence, and trust and the reliance of one upon judgment and advice of another.” Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich App 501, 508; 536 NW2d 280 (1980). “Relief is granted when such position of influence has been acquired and abused, or when confidence has been reposed or betrayed,” Id. In denying Mr. Czajka’s claim, the Court of Appeals noted that the Association’s governing documents require all development plans to be submitted to the architectural committee for review and approval. The documents additionally state that no property may be used for commercial or business purposes, and that violations of the governing documents could be prosecuted by the homeowners association. The Court found that Mr. Czajka’s actions, such as removing trees, installing gravel and grading, and Mr. Czajka’s failure to cooperate with the HOA, gave the HOA a credible basis for pursuing litigation. Enforcement of the governing documents was not an abuse of power.
A Claim for Trespass is Not Viable When a Contract Controls
The homeowners association argued, in part, that Mr. Czajka’s removal of trees on Lot 1, in violation of the governing documents, constituted a trespass. As previously stated, the governing documents are contractual in nature. The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that “a tort action will not lie when based solely on the nonperformance of contractual duty.” Fultz v Union-Commerce Associates, 470 Mich 460,466; 683 NW2d 587 (2004). As such, the Court of Appeals denied the trespass claim, leaving the Association to contractual remedies.
Key Takeaways for Michigan Homeowners Associations
The Carnegie Woods decision reinforces several practical lessons for Michigan homeowners associations, which are as follows:
- Courts will enforce clear and unambiguous easement language as written. If a recorded document grants use of a private road to lot owners without limiting the type of use, a court is unlikely to read additional restrictions into that language.
- Legal deadlines matter. Statutes of limitation strictly govern claims such as slander of title. A community association that delays action may permanently lose the ability to challenge a recorded interest.
- Allegations that an owner’s conduct is overly burdensome or improper must be supported by evidence. Courts will not rely on assumptions or speculation when deciding whether an easement has been misused.
For Michigan HOA boards, the key takeaway is simple: understand the precise language of your restrictive covenants, act promptly when issues arise, and ensure that bylaw enforcement decisions are grounded in both the governing documents and applicable Michigan law.
